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This article examines how the key Orthodox actors in Moldova have reacted to chal-lenging equal opportunities legislation. The 
author suggests, on the basis of an economic 
approach to religion, that under the conditions 
of a deregulated religious market they use vari-
ous strategies to promote their agendas. The 
Moldovan Orthodox Church (the Metropolitan-
ate of Moldova), autonomous within the Russian 
Orthodox Church, previously relied on making 
private bargains with the government; but this 
policy ended with the adoption of the 2013 Law 
on Ensuring Equality in the Republic of Moldova. 
Now the Metropolitanate tries to assimilate 
the strategies of direct action, but without suc-
cess. The so-called ‘non-mentioning’ radicals, 
technically being part of the Metropolitanate 
of Moldova, but not praying for its bishop, are 
involved in direct political activism – from set-
ting up protest camps to street fighting – to 
confront de-stigmatization of homosexuality. 
The Bessarabian Metropolitanate of the Roma-
nian Orthodox Church utilizes the strategies of 
European ‘public’ churches and gains influence 
through performing some useful social functions. 
This article concludes that all actors have their 
own advantages and weaknesses; nevertheless, 
so far the Metropolitanate of Moldova remains 
the strongest; while the other competitors are 
serving specific religious niches, it is this body 
which still possesses the potential to influence 
society more broadly.
Introduction1
Moldovan society2 is currently in a process 
of post-socialist transformation which has 
already become the subject of a number of 
academic studies (see, e.g., Iordache 2018; 
Ganzevoort and Sremac 2017; Bilic 2016; 
Slootmaeckers et al. 2016; Sremac and 
Ganzevoort 2015; Ayoub and Paternotte 
2014). Pressure from the outside, known as 
Europeanisation  brings about a more rapid 
change than would have happened ‘natur-
ally’. The sphere of sexual morality, includ-
ing domestic violence, gender roles, and 
the destigmatization of the LGBT commu-
nity are becoming particularly important. 
Within the last two decades or less, pro-
found changes in this area have affected the 
Western world: even in supposedly liberal 
France thousands have protested against 
same-sex marriages. It is no surprise that 
post-socialist states, living in a state of 
uncertainty between European integration, 
a socialist past and the impact of nationalist 
myths, experience problems with adopting 
non-discriminatory policies from Europe. 
1 This research has been supported by the 
Russian Foundation for Basic Research, 
Grant no. 18-011-00598.
2 The research does not cover the self-pro-
claimed Transnistrian Republic.
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In Moldova legally securing some rights for 
the LGBT community (in no way same-sex 
partnership) has provoked a fierce social 
movement of counter-reaction. Joining 
the ongoing discussion on the topic of the 
LGBT community has provided Orthodox 
actors with an opportunity to reach a wider 
portion of society than it has been able to 
before.3
This article aims at uncovering how the 
key Orthodox actors have reacted to the 
challenge of equal opportunities legislation, 
and to evaluate the strategies they use to 
mobilize supporters for their cause. The key 
actors are the Moldovan Orthodox Church 
(the Metropolitanate of Moldova) autono-
mous within the Russian Orthodox Church, 
and the Bessarabian Metropolitanate of 
the Romanian Orthodox Church. Other 
Ortho dox groups (Old Believers, non- 
canon ical jurisdictions) enjoy very limited 
influence and remain beyond the scope of 
this publication. 
The economic approach to religion 
(Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Stark and Ian-
nac cone 1994; Iannaccone 1997; Young 
1997; Stark and Finke 2000; Chesnut 
2003; for a critical survey of the theory 
see Lehmann 2010; Kargina 2014) allows 
for conceptualizing multiple Orthodox 
actors as competing religious producers. 
In 2011–13 the Republic of Moldova made 
a transition from being a regulated reli-
gious market, where the Metropolitanate of 
Moldova, according to the UN Special Rap-
porteur, enjoyed informal privileged treat-
ment (United Nations 2012: 9–10), to more 
or less free religious competition. Due to the 
legalisation of Islam in 2011 and amend-
ments made in 2012 to the legislation on 
3 They struggle against abortion too, but it 
was legalized may decades ago in the USSR, 
and the topic is meaningful only for prac-
ticing believers.
freedom of conscience, Orthodox Chris-
tianity as a whole has found itself in a situ-
ation of religious pluralism. While Islamic 
influence in Moldova remains limited, mul-
tiple Protestant denominations represent a 
serious challenge to Orthodoxy. Besides, 
the Metropolitanate of Moldova, previ-
ously a state-protected ‘monopoly’, has to 
compete with alternative ‘suppliers’. Those 
actors, who adjust better to the changed 
market conditions and win more support, 
can be evaluated as stronger competitors. 
Apart from printed and electronic 
sources, I rely on observations made dur-
ing my research visits to Moldova (2011, 
2013, 2019); and on ten semi-structured 
interviews taken at different stages of the 
research. The Metropolitanate of Mol-
dova is represented by its secretary Fr 
Vadim Cheibaş; Chair of the Synodal 
Youth Department, Fr Octavian Moșin; Fr 
Nikolai Florinskii and Fr Vitalii Shinkar 
from the parish of St George in Chișinău; 
and Fr Vasilie, who insisted on maintain-
ing his anonymity. The radicals, technic-
ally being part of the Metropolitanate of 
Moldova, but not praying for its bishop, are 
represented by Fr Anatolie Cibric. Fr Ioan 
Cosoi is the secretary of the Bessarabian 
Metropolitanate and director of its so cial 
projects. I also quote from a previously 
unpublished 2011 interview with a Mol-
dovan lay theologian Nicolae Fuştei, and 
with Ian Feldman, president (from 2015) 
of the Council for the Prevention and 
Elimination of Discrimination and Ensur-
ing Equality. Interviews and observations 
are crucial for this research, because reli-
gious life in Moldova is scantily docu-
mented; therefore, this publication pursues 
the additional end of collecting descriptive 
data. 
In 2010 the European Union made 
effective protection from all forms of dis -
crimination – including on the basis of 
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sexual orientation – the condition for 
lifting the visa obligation for citizens 
of Moldova. The new Law on Ensuring 
Equality was officially adopted by its par-
liament in May 2012. The first draft of this 
document underwent revisions; the final 
version having been modified to satisfy the 
demands of the Church. Oleg Efrim, erst-
while Minister of Justice, told me that ‘we 
have taken into consideration all the wishes 
of the Church except the one that this law 
should not exist’ (Efrim 2013). Sexual 
orien tation-based discrimination was now 
prohibited only in the sphere of employ-
ment – meaning, verbal condemnations of 
homosexuality could not be legally pun-
ished; an amendment was made allowing 
religious organizations to employ (or not 
employ) whoever they wanted. Article one 
of the Law on Ensuring Equality indicates 
that the provisions of the law are not related 
to and cannot be interpreted as causing 
damage to (1) family, based on marriage 
between a man and a woman, (2) adoption, 
and (3) ‘religious cults and their compon-
ents in the part related to religious beliefs’ 
(Lex.justice.md 2012). Nevertheless, the 
law is still seen by the Moldovan Church 
as unsatisfactory, since it forbids offending 
individuals on the basis of their homosexu-
ality and obliges all non-religious employ-
ers (schools, businesses, etc.) not to dis-
criminate against homosexuals.
The Council for the Prevention and 
Elimin ation of Discrimination and Ensur-
ing Equality was established in 2013 to 
respond to complaints issued by private 
citizens. Ian Feldman stresses that their 
activities are mostly focused on the rights 
of the disabled, and that the largest annual 
share of LGBT cases has been five per cent 
(Feldman 2019). Nevertheless, political 
actors pay most of their attention to these 
cases. Pride marches have been held in 
Chișinău since 2013. They are not large, 
but they are symbolically significant, as 
they are in all post-socialist countries; these 
processions, heavily guarded by the police, 
have already attracted academic attention 
in the field of what might be called ‘Pride 
studies’ (see, e.g., Drissel 2016; Igrutinović 
et al. 2015). 
The Metropolitanate of Moldova:  
hold the balance until you fall
The position of the Metropolitanate of 
Moldova with regard to non-discrimin-
ation policies seems uncompromising. 
In summer 2013 Metropolitan Vladimir 
(Cantarean) promised to excommuni-
cate politicians who had voted for the 
Law on Ensuring Equality a month ear-
lier. In September 2014 the Synod issued 
a ‘Condemnation of gay parades and of 
the consequences of adopting the Law 
on Ensuring Equal Opportunities’, which 
explicitly accused the government of col-
laborating with those who promoted sinful 
behaviour, thus ‘targeting the founda-
tion of the most holy values of our people’ 
(Biserica Ortodoxă din Moldova 2014).4 
No politician, nevertheless, has ever been 
excommunicated. The Church protested 
by organising – to counterveil the Pride 
demonstration – its own rallies. Headed by 
Metropolitan Vladimir personally, a ‘silent 
march’ has been held annually since 2013 as 
a procession of priests, monastics and fami-
lies (often with children), as well as of single 
laypeople singing Orthodox hymns and 
holding pro-family posters, such as images 
of the Romanov Holy Royal Family.5 The 
marches signify a break from the habitual 
4 The document was inspired by protest-
ing activity of the radicals to be discussed 
below.
5 Such processions became characteristic of 
all post-socialist countries facing the reality 
of Pride marches in their urban spaces. 
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modus operandi of the Metropolitanate of 
Moldova: informal agreements with the 
government where concessions used to be 
exchanged for ecclesiastical loyalty. 
There are at least two reasons why the 
mainstream Church remains unwilling to 
set itself against state authorities even while 
disapproving of specific policies. First of 
all, whilst trusting the Church, people dis-
trust its bishops and the clergy in general, 
because many priests are involved in com-
mercial activities which include selling 
and renting out the property of parishes 
(Chebotar 2018). Some bishops are seen 
to be living luxuriously: in 2014 a tabloid 
published some photos of Metropolitan 
Vladimir vacationing with a woman, and 
other compromising details (Moşneag 
2014).6 In 2017 there was a widely negative 
response to a birthday party for the Bishop 
of Ungheni, Petru Musteață (YouTube 
2017). According to Nikolae Fuştei, Petru 
was from the very beginning a contro-
versial figure: in 2005 his ordination pro-
voked a split, and forty parishes (of one 
hundred) left and joined the Bessarabian 
Metropolitanate (Fuştei 2011). At the same 
time, it is normal for priests to have to do 
jobs on the side, and even become migrant 
labourers; for example, one cleric works in 
the UK at a poultry farm (Florinskii 2019). 
Fuştei stressed that:
It sounds strange but in all the sur-
veys enquiring into which institution 
in the country is the most trusted – the 
Church, gets about eighty per cent. But 
people do not equate bishops with the 
Church. That is why during the elec-
tions less than one per cent voted for 
6 Some internet commentators expressed 
their satisfaction that Vladimir was, at least, 
not gay; later on the Metropolitan publicly 
claimed that the woman was his niece.
the party which the Metropolitan had 
called on the public to vote for. Im agine: 
eighty per cent think that the Church is 
the most authoritative and trustwor-
thy institution, and, at the same time, 
less than one per cent vote for someone 
who appears to be campaigned for by 
the church. (Fuştei 2011)
Fuştei refers to the 2010 parliamentary 
elections, when Metropolitan Vladimir 
openly supported Valery Pasat’s party,7 
and even permitted use of a photo of them 
together in the campaign. Pasat won only 
0.9 per cent of the vote, and since then 
Metropolitan Vladimir has never partici-
pated in political campaigns.
The second reason why the mainstream 
Church is interested in good connections 
with the government is due to its inabil-
ity to reach beyond the stratum of ‘trad-
itional believers’ interested in a limited set 
of services: baptisms, weddings, and funer-
als. In Russia the Church faced the same 
problem at the end of the 1980s, but was 
able to resolve it, or postpone dealing with 
it, thanks to a large influx of young neo-
phytes. Orthodoxy in Moldova never fully 
disappeared from the lives of the people; 
but it was never an object of acute neo-
phytic interest. The local clergy was not 
ready for the fact that the older generation 
of parishioners will simply pass away (or 
for the role played by migration); they have 
no idea of how to replenish their flock. The 
Metropolitanate of Moldova has no social 
department, even, and Fr Octavian Moşin 
has to deal with social projects, formally 
being responsible only for the youth. He 
regrets that only a few parishes conduct 
some non-religious social projects: 
7 Valery Pasat (b. 1958) is a Moldovan pol-
itician who in 2010 was the head of the 
Humanistic Party.
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There are no young people in the par-
ishes. Everyone leaves, so, in the par-
ishes there are only old people. I think 
– it is our first problem. Second, there 
are no specific projects to involve the 
young people… It gets harder and 
harder every year. (Moșin 2019)
I pay this much attention to social and 
youth work, because in contemporary 
society organised religions have to com-
pete with more attractive ways of spend-
ing time. Providing space for socialization 
(for example, through social volunteer-
ing) attracts new, younger parishioners. 
A disadvantage of the youth and social 
work in the Metropolitanate of Moldova is 
that Church-sponsored events are mostly 
designed for people already deeply involved 
in ecclesiastical life (e.g., reading the Bible, 
joint prayers, celebrating holidays, etc.). 
As a result, ‘silent marches’ are scantly 
attended: ‘A few tens of people come, not 
more… Mostly people of the Church, I 
mean – priests, their families, and so on… 
As for [people] from the parishes – maybe 
one, or two’ (Moșin 2019). Fr Cheibaş also 
confirmed that ‘it becomes more diffi-
cult to gather our people around this idea’ 
(Cheibaş 2019).
In the absence of significant public sup-
port, the Church gradually returns to its 
bargaining strategy. The Metropolitanate 
had already engaged in unofficial talks with 
the prospect of not only changing the legis-
lation on equality, but also reintroducing a 
regulated religious market:
There are also promises from the 
Socialist party, the party of the presi-
dent, in this regard; and from the 
Democratic party too. A month ago 
we had meetings with the chair of 
the Democratic party, which is the 
ruling one now in Moldova, and they 
also promised somehow to change 
all that… to add this phrase, the syn-
tagma that state should support the 
Church.
Question: The Church, not religions 
in general?
Answer: Religions, of course; but, as 
Lenin used to say: ‘we say one thing, 
but we mean another’. (Cheibaş 2019)
Fr Cheibaş expects a levelling of the 
income gap between the urban and the 
rural clergy and channelling of European 
subsidies into the historical monasteries: 
All the spiritual potential of Moldova 
at the other side [i.e. Romanian inner 
Moldova] has been renovated thanks 
to these funds. Each monastery got 
two or three million [euros]. It is so 
far impossible for us, because all the 
money from the European Union are 
transferred through the government. 
(Cheibaş 2019)
Father Octavian Moșin.
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Fr Cheibaş added that the Metro politan-
ate is concerned about not repeating the 
Ukrainian scenario, where the government 
explicitly supported the new autocephalous 
church: ‘We should not forget what has 
happened there [in Ukraine] and should 
find our golden mean in this friendship 
with political leaders in order to protect 
our identity’ (Cheibaş 2019). Although the 
formation of a rival autocephalous Church 
in Moldova is hardly likely in the foresee-
able future, relocation of state support to 
the existing Bessarabian Metropolitanate 
represents a real danger. 
Ian Feldman evaluates the hopes of 
the Metropolitanate as ‘wishful thinking’ 
(Feldman 2019); he is right, because in a 
country whose population heavily depends 
on working in Europe no party would be 
brave enough to amend agreements con-
cerning visa liberalization. Igor Dodon, 
the President of Moldova, looks like a reli-
able supporter for the Metropolitanate 
of Moldova, but the situation is not that 
simple. Dodon tries to instrumentalize 
the issue of LGBT equality by presenting 
himself as a protector of traditional family 
values. Apart from participating – with 
his family – in the ‘silent marches’, he ini-
tiated an annual ‘Festival of Family’. The 
year 2019 in Moldova is proclaimed the 
‘Year of the Family’. Under Dodon’s patron-
age, in September 2018 Chişinău hosted 
the World Congress of Families (IOF web-
site). Fr Cheibaş stresses that the congress 
was not organised by the Church (Cheibaş 
2019). Metropolitan Vladimir did not even 
address the forum; neither did Patriarch 
Kirill, although Dodon planned to invite 
him to Moldova precisely for the event.
The presidential address at the closing 
session of the World Congress of Families 
had not much in common with the agenda, 
but was full of references to the political 
situation in Moldova. He tried to present 
himself as a leader promoting Moldovan 
sovereignty and the unity of all ethnic 
groups.8 His message, apparently designed 
for a wider domestic audience, presented 
an enigma to the foreign delegates:
We will preserve and defend our 
essence, identity, and values. For it is 
sacred for us. It is all we have. We have 
no strong army; we have no gas and oil. 
We have people, we have traditions, 
we have faith, and we have history. We 
are strong thanks to it – without army, 
without oil, without gas. Why destroy 
all this? (YouTube 2018a)
Dodon’s backing in many ways can be 
said to undermine the Metropolitanate, 
8 He spoke in Russian, stressing that more 
than one million Moldovan citizens use this 
language.
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Father Vadim Cheibaș. 
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whose pro-family initiatives are seen by 
the general public as political rallies in sup-
port of Dodon. The Metropolitanate has 
to strike a balance between the president 
and his political adversaries: ‘One polit-
ical structure is sympathetic to the East, 
one political structure is sympathetic to the 
West. So far this balance is very… favour-
able for the Orthodox Church’ (Cheibaş 
2019). In spite of many verbal condemna-
tions of European integration previously 
made by the Synod and by Metropolitan 
Vladimir personally, Fr Cheibaş rounded 
off with the statement that  ‘If the state is 
already oriented towards this process – can 
the Church ever be against it?’ (ibid.)
Priests on the whole are not so moder-
ate. Fr Vitalii Shinkar says that ‘the main 
European value is pederasty’ (Shinkar 
2019). In 2018 he was one of the four 
priests (including Marchel, the Bishop of 
Bălți and Fălești) who were fined in 2016 
for insulting a presidential candidate Maia 
Sandu: they said that she was ‘barren’ (i.e., 
not married and without children in her 
forties) and a danger to Christian soci-
ety because of her tolerant attitude to 
sexual minorities (Privesc.eu 2016). The 
Metropolitanate of Moldova neither stood 
in solidarity with these priests, nor issued 
any letters in their support. Not once did 
Metropolitan Vladimir threaten to defrock 
Bishop Marchel for his participation in 
street protests against the new legislation.
The radicals: the end is nigh
The radicals are a loose community of 
the clergy and laity, partly organised 
around small formal and informal groups, 
of which the most well-known are the 
Asociaţia Fericita Maică Matrona (‘Blessed 
Gerontissa Matrona’) headed by Arch -
priest Anatolie Cibric (see Ulmanu 2013; 
Mitrofanova, forthcoming), and the Pro 
Ortodoxia association led by Deacon Ghe-
nadie Valuța. Originally they derive from 
the Moldovan Orthodox Church and share 
the same ideology, but disagree about the 
means to implement it.
These people are a social and ecclesi-
astical minority; sometimes the Council 
for the Prevention and Elimination of 
Discrimination and Ensuring Equality pro-
tects their rights as well. Feldman recalls 
that someone, apparently from the radical 
Orthodox milieu has applied to the council 
because without an enumerated ID card, he 
was granted no access to medical services:
The Council, having considered his 
case, said that it was, in our opinion, 
discrimination… State should find out 
how to protect the rights of this small 
group of people… We have sent a copy 
of the decision to the Metropolitanate 
of Moldova, but there was no reac-
tion. And this man, when he came 
to me, he said: as I was going to you, 
I thought that there would be truly 
demonic scum here, that you were 
for gays only; but you were the only 
people, with whom I found under-
standing of my situation, support, 
and you even made a decision in my 
favour. (Feldman 2019)
The radicals have a clear understand-
ing of why they oppose the normaliza-
tion of homosexuality. The mainstream 
Church mostly refers to the obscure dis-
course of ‘traditional values’, admitting (at 
least, at the level of ordinary priests), that 
in contemporary Moldova one can only 
speak about some persistent rural tradi-
tions, gradually withering away because 
of urbanization; ‘the traditions to deco-
rate churches with rags’ (Florinskii 2019). 
So far the Metropolitanate of Moldova has 
produced no published material as a theo-
logical foundation for its opposition to 
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homosexuality. The 2014 document con-
demning gay parades contains only one, 
moderate, reference from the Bible (2 Cor. 
6:17). In this light, it becomes problem-
atic for the clergy to explain theologically 
why they oppose the Pride marches, and Fr 
Florinskii has resorted to rhetorical ques-
tions: ‘Why is the Church against them? – 
And why do you not eat glass?’ (Florinskii 
2019). The ambiguity of the term ‘tradi-
tional values’ allows Ian Feldman to claim 
semi-serious ly that his Council is, actually, 
the main defender of these values, because 
it ‘protects values of maternity, values of 
supporting the seniors, etc.’ (Feldman 
2019).
Explanations provided by the radicals 
are much more theologically refined, and 
this is mostly to the credit of Viorel (Vene-
dict) Ciubotaru – an independent journal-
ist and thinker who used to be associated 
with ‘Blessed Gerontissa Matrona’. First, he 
articulated ethical arguments against the 
newly adopted Law on Ensuring Equality: 
First time at the level of legislature 
some things being wicked, bad, abnor-
mal, are proclaimed equivalent to the 
normal… the horror of this law is that 
the evil, in fact, is proclaimed a vari-
ation of the good. (YouTube 2012)
Then, Ciubotaru proceeded to more 
pro found themes, presenting homosexual-
ity as something ontologically vicious, able 
to distort God-created human nature and 
to destroy the likeness to God in human 
beings: 
By this law, in fact, the very notion 
of human is being eliminated in us, 
because a human is a being able to 
dis tinguish between the good and 
the evil… If we base on the European 
values, the new type of human is pro-
duced, previously unknown to his-
tory: I would call it anti-human. 
(YouTube 2012) 
The rhetoric of traditional values seems 
to be irrelevant for the radicals; Fr Cibric 
says that ‘traditional values mean betrayal… 
in the past people just lived in accordance 
with these values and did not protect them’ 
(Cibric 2019). None of the radicals partici-
pated in the Congress of Families.
Another difference between the main-
stream Church and the radicals is that 
the latter refuse to accept the unwritten 
pact of friendship with the government. 
According to Fr Cibric, ‘one should not 
play by the rules of a gangster; and they [the 
Metropolitanate of Moldova] play by the 
rules of a gangster’ (Cibric 2019). While the 
Metropolitanate writes letters to the presi-
dent and the parliament, the radicals are 
becoming engaged in direct political activ-
ism – from protest camps to street fighting. 
Since 2013 they have organised counter-
demonstrations to interrupt and disperse 
‘gay parades’ (of which none looked like 
a gay parade in the European sense). Riot 
police guarding the Pride marches was par-
ticularly violent towards the radicals in 
2018. The Metropolitanate expressed its 
disapproval of violence, distancing itself, at 
the same time, from the anti-Pride protests:
We [the Metropolitanate] have good 
relations with the police. And in 
case such clashes with demonstrat-
ors happen… well, they also want us 
to understand their position, because 
they have to keep order… Policemen 
themselves are sort of against this idea 
[of the Prides], these minorities, at the 
same time they have to keep order. 
(Cheibaş 2019)
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Those protest marches against the 
gay parade were not organised by the 
Church. It comes more like society’s 
reaction. I would not say that only the 
Orthodox, or only the believers parti-
cipated there; it was society, I mean, 
people, who are against this phenom-
enon, against gay parades. (Moşin 
2019)
Activities of the radicals are directed 
against the mainstream Church not less 
than against state policies. In summer 
2014 Fr Ghenadie Valuța initiated a two-
months’ protest camp along the fence of 
the Metropolitanate building, demand-
ing an official condemnation of the Law 
on Equality and of the Pride marches: 
the above-mentioned document on gay 
parades, as well as another paper directed 
against European integration in general, 
were adopted by the Synod under pres-
sure from below. Both documents are now 
available at the official ecclesiastical web-
site only in their scanned versions, which 
makes finding them complicated. Fr Valuța 
was then temporarily suspended; there are 
persistent rumours that one of the reasons 
was that he had been involved in publicis-
ing the notorious pictures of Metropolitan 
Vladimir (Vedomosti 2015).
The radicals claim that the Church 
lacks sobornost (‘conciliarity’), and this 
makes it unable to defend Christian values. 
This issue was brought to my attention by 
Nicolae Fuştei:
Many priests let themselves ask: where 
is the conciliar principle (sobornoe 
nachalo) of the Orthodox Church in 
Mol dova, why is everything decided 
by one person? However smart he may 
be, but he cannot know everything, 
and he cannot control everything. It 
is the Church, the body of Christ … 
where every member is important for 
the life of the organism. (Fuştei 2011)
Nikolai Fuştei and Viorel Ciubotaru 
have very low opinions of each other; 
never theless, both do not want one person 
in the Church to decide for all:
The Metropolitanate cannot be 
reduced to the personality of the Met-
ro politan. The Metropolitanate, if it is 
a Church, and not a private office of 
citizen Vladimir Cantarean, work ing 
as the manager of this office, em braces 
all Orthodox members in its terri-
tory… All decisions in the Church 
should be made on a conciliar basis 
(soborno). (Vedomosti 2014)
Since around 2016, many radicals 
have ceased to pray for Patriarch Kirill 
and Metropolitan Vladimir during litur-
gical services – such believers are known 
in the Russian Orthodox Church as ‘non-
mentioning’. The split was triggered by 
the Patriarch’s meeting with the Pope in 
Havana. Viorel Ciubotaru joined the non-
mentioning side earlier on the ground of 
a ‘homosexualization’ of the mainstream 
Church:
According to the canons of the 
Church citizens Filat, Timofti, Prime 
Minister Leancă, Ministers of Justice 
(Efrim and Tănase) and all the 53 dep-
uties, who have voted for the law on 
homosexualization, for lifting the ban 
on homosexual propaganda among 
minors, should be anathematized. 
Instead, citizen Vladimir Cantarean 
has awarded these people represented 
by Filat the Order of Appreciation. 
This means that the Metropolitan is 
not with the Orthodox Church, but 
with the ‘Satanic gathering’, which 
105Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 
is what the existing government is. 
(Vedomosti 2014)
The non-mentioning group do not en -
vision themselves as schismatics, insisting 
that they remain within the Church, while 
the Patriarch and bishops have excommu-
nicated themselves:
The Metropolitan is doing strictly 
her etical deeds, having no relation 
to Orthodoxy, as well as his secre-
tary Archpriest Vadim Cheibaş. The 
Metro politan, doing what is contrary 
to Orthodoxy, becomes a false bishop 
and, by this, he loses the apostolic suc-
cession, ceasing to be the member of 
the Orthodox Church. (Vedomosti 
2014)
The absence of the bishops needed to 
ordain new priests is a problem for the non-
mentioning believers. Father Vasilie says 
that they have a plan to ordain as bishop 
a hieromonk from Răciula Monastery; 
Archimandrite Pafnutie, an active par-
ticipant of rallies against homosexual-
ity (YouTube 2018b). Pafnutie forbids 
his spiritual children to attend liturgies 
where people pray for the Patriarch, and 
to consume liturgical bread given by loyal 
priests, recommending them ‘to dispose of 
it’ (Vasilie 2019). It is unclear which non-
mentioning bishop is expected to ordain 
Pafnutie, but according to Vasilie this must 
be someone from Ukraine. 
The radicals are backed by some main-
stream hierarchs, of whom Marchel, Bishop 
of Bălți and Făleşti, is the most high pro-
file.9 External observers suggest that ‘this 
specific activity of Marchel depends on 
his wish to become the Metropolitan of 
Moldova… If this happens, at the moment 
he becomes the Metropoitan (if and when), 
he will change his rhetoric’ (Feldman 2019; 
see also Esp.md 2012). Anyhow, Marchel 
seems uninterested in joining the non-
mentioning group, although they are in 
urgent need of a bishop. 
What is not fully clear is why none 
of the non-mentioning priests has yet 
been suspended. Fr Cibric insists that 
9 Bishop Petru of Ungheni is also support-
ive of the radicals; Archimandrite Pafnutie 
belongs to his bishopric.
Assembly of the non-mentioning priests in Krasnodar, Russia, 5.10.2017. Fr Cibric is third from 
the left.
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Metro politan Vladimir ‘knows for sure that 
I am right’, and admits that he has once 
said to Vladimir: ‘I pray for you secretly’ 
(Cibric 2019). A mundane explanation is 
that the Moldovan Church, after 27 years 
of performing a ‘balancing act’ has become 
dan gerously fragmented and sometimes 
appears as a collection of independent par-
ishes. Nicolae Fustei stresses that:
[People] look for a faithful priest, and 
they are not interested in which juris-
diction this priest is… These priests 
are authoritative, naturally, for their 
parishes. And one can see, which 
church has an authoritative priest, and 
which does not: just enter this church 
dur ing Liturgy, and look, which 
church is empty and where people are 
stand ing even in the street and listen 
to the Liturgy. (Fustei 2011)
Fr Nikolai Florinskii agrees that each 
Moldovan priest is ‘the Patriarch in his 
parish’, ‘distanced from Moscow, …dis-
tanced from Bucharest’ (Florinskii 2019). 
This fragmentation does not allow the 
Metropolitan to dispose of ‘authoritative’ 
priests, while risking loss of their flock 
too. The above-mentioned Pafnutie is an 
ex ample of such priests, thanks to his asser-
tive and emotional style of preaching, even 
going so far as (according to Fr Vasilie) 
burst ing into tears.
Police violence in 2018 had diverted the 
radicals from physically confronting the 
Pride demonstration in May 2019. Fr Cibric 
deemed street fights to be useless because 
the time of Judgement had come and ‘we 
were waiting for the end’ (Cibric 2019).
The Bessarabian Metropolitanate:  
a nascent ‘public’ church
In October 1992, when the assembly of the 
Moldovan clergy decided to stay within 
the Moscow Patriarchate, a group of cler-
ics broke away. To admit them, the Ro -
manian Church restored its Bessarabian 
Metropolitanate, open to priests and parish 
communities wishing to leave the jurisdic-
tion of the Russian Church in Moldova and 
Ukraine (see Avram 2014). Although the 
Russian and Romanian Churches remain in 
Eucharistic communication, in Moldovan 
territory the flock of the Metropolitanate 
of Moldova is not in communion with the 
Bessarabian Metropolitanate.
The Romanian Church has its own his-
tory of confronting equal opportunities 
policies in Romania, but without any signi-
ficant results (see Conovici 2009–10; Cirlan 
2019). A referendum held in 2018 was the 
last initiative of the conservatives; its pur-
pose was to secure that marriage would 
be defined as a union between a man and 
a woman. Fr Ioan Cosoi, secretary of the 
Bessarabian Metropolitanate, said that in 
the days of the referendum the Bessarabian 
priests in Moldova ‘were saying in all par-
ishes that those who possess Romanian 
citizenship must go to the referendum, 
because its subject was good and we must 
protect our children, our future’ (Cosoi 
2019). The referendum, never theless, failed 
because of a low turnout. According to Fr 
Cosoi, his bishopric is concerned with trad-
itional values, but works ‘at the other level’: 
‘in the Metropolitanate of Moldova there 
are groups of people who go out to protest. 
We do not have such a policy to go out and 
protest’ (ibid.). Ian Feldman confirms that 
he has never heard ‘strong statements’ from 
the Bessarabian priests (Feldman 2019).
The ‘other level’ refers to system-
atic social and youth work done by the 
Romanian Church. Fr Cosoi has shown 
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me a shelter for single mothers aban-
doned by their families, and a ‘social apart-
ment’ where girls from families in crisis 
can live for a year and learn useful trades. 
Social projects are run by volunteers and 
paid employees; steady parishioners and 
non-believers. Volunteers are attracted by 
three things: opportunities for professional 
development while working for projects; 
‘volunteer cards’ which may later help hold-
ers to enrol into a university; and ‘showing 
the other side of the Church – namely social 
influence. If they have their own place, 
and this place is very important, they can 
make decisions in our organization, they 
come’ (Cosoi 2019). Speaking the language 
of the market, however, the Bessarabian 
Metropolitanate is sponsored by the Ro -
manian state and the European Union, 
while the Metropolitanate of Moldova has 
no external financial resources. At the same 
time, the Russian Orthodox Church (also 
having no such resources) has initiated its 
own social work system, analogous to the 
Romanian ‘Diaconia’, and already provides 
grants for NGOs. The Moldovan Church, 
as I concluded from the interview with 
Fr Moşin, does not do, or plan, anything 
similar.
According to Fr Cosoi, his faith com-
munity experiences depopulation problems 
comparable with those of the Moldovan 
Orthodox Church:
Headquarters of the social division of the 
Bessarabian Metropolitanate in a remote dis-
trict of Chișinău. 
Anastasia V. Mitrofanova
Poster of the social work conducted by the Bessarabian Metropolitanate in Moldova. 
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Our villages are dying now, because all 
the young people leave villages, leave 
for cities – move here, to Chișinău, or 
abroad… When I was young, I mean 
– at school – our parents moved out, 
but they moved out to come back 
with money, to build a house and so 
on. Now they leave, then they come 
back, take their families, and all of 
them leave. I talked to our priests, and 
they say: Father, when I came to my 
parish in 91, or in 93, or in 95, I had 
one hundred baptisms there, one hun-
dred weddings; and now I have two or 
three in a whole year, but one hundred 
funerals. (Cosoi 2019)
The Bessarabian Metropolitanate has 
chosen its own strategy for adaptation: to 
be a European-style church that remains 
deeply involved in social life, providing 
assistance to those in need, but stays within 
the framework set by the democratic state. 
Jose Casanova has called it ‘public religion’ 
(Casanova 1994: 57). Being a ‘European 
church’ presumes also some level of democ-
ratization. Fr Cosoi says that even the nega-
tive media coverage of the Metropolitanate 
of Moldova is harmful for the Orthodox 
Church as a whole:
We have some bishops, and they are 
like barons, they have luxury, live lux-
urious lives… There was that birth-
day party for Bishop Petru from 
Ungheni… Generally, the Orthodox 
Church as such should now demon-
strate great humility: that you are a 
humble man, one of us… (Cosoi 2019)
The social activism of the Bessarabian 
Metropolitanate does not make it popu-
lar: so far it has attracted about ten per cent 
of the priests (Florinskii 2019); the exact 
number of parishes is unknown, but it is 
much lower than at the Metropolinate of 
Moldova. While it is sociologically proven 
that most people in Moldova declare that 
they have a specific Moldovan identity 
(Kirillov and Putintsev 2018: 44), this 
bishopric insists that the Moldovans are 
a regional variation of the Romanians. 
It is not that the Bessarabian parishes are 
attended only by believers with a Ro -
manian identity, but such people do feel 
more comfortable there. Another prob-
lem of this bishopric is that sometimes it 
offers solutions tailored for a society with 
much longer history of Europeanization. 
The position of the Romanian Church in 
Romania is much stronger than the posi-
tion of its Bessarabian Metropolitanate, 
because the Romanian Church has been 
changing in step with with Romanian soci-
ety, or even much more slowly. In Moldova 
the Bessarabian Metropolitanate is at 
the moment more Europeanized than its 
potential followers. 
Conclusion
Under the conditions of a deregulated 
reli gious market, key Orthodox actors in 
Mo ldova explore three different strategies 
to win public support. 
Since its formation in 1992 the Metro-
politanate of Moldova has struck a balance 
between political groupings and relied on 
private bargains with their leaders. Splits in 
the political class played into the hands of 
the Church, because each faction tried to 
present the Metropolitan as its supporter. 
This policy of ‘balancing’ came to the end 
with the adoption of the Law on Ensuring 
Equality, and the religious monopoly of the 
Church began to wither away. Recently, the 
Metropolitanate has tried to assimilate the 
strategies of street politics, characteristic 
of the competing radical groups, but with-
out any visible success. Ordinary believ-
ers are less and less inclined to participate 
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in the initiatives of the Metropolitanate. 
Priests and bishops pursue their private 
goals, and the Church remains united only 
by Metropolitan Vladimir, to whom people 
remain personally loyal. The rise of com-
peting ‘religious suppliers’ from within con-
tinuously undermines the influence of the 
Metropolitanate. The latter strives to bring 
back a regulated religious market, and even 
speaks in support of Europeanization, as 
long as this concept entails state support of 
churches.
The Bessarabian Metropolitanate seems 
well equipped for finding its place in the 
changing social order. It utilises the strat-
egies of the European ‘public’ churches and 
gains social influence through perform-
ing useful social functions without pre-
tending to be the spiritual guide of society 
as a whole. At the same time, in terms of 
the market theory of religion, providing 
non-religious communal services attracts 
‘free riders’ rather than devout believ-
ers (Iannaccone 2012: 113). Compared 
with the ‘outdated’ Moldovan Church, the 
Bessarabian Metropolitanate has surpris-
ingly few followers (although its num-
bers may grow with years). As a result, it 
needs financial support from Romania and 
the EU, and has to serve a ‘market niche’ 
of believers with a strong Romanian iden-
tity. To reach beyond this stratum, this 
bishopric needs to admit that most people 
in Moldova see themselves as a sovereign 
nation; this, however, would hardly be pos-
sible for the Romanian Church in general.
The radicals are a competing group that 
almost split from the erstwhile monopol - 
 istic Church. They utilise the strategy of 
direct action, involving their supporters 
in street-political carnival activities. Their 
opposition to the equal opportunities leg-
islation is strongly expressed, and they 
are able to satisfy the need for authorita-
tive ecclesiastical leaders. The radicals are 
not associated with concrete political fig-
ures and are open to coalitions with other 
like-minded actors, for example, with con-
servative Protestants. There are, however, 
important factors playing against them. 
First, the radicals are relatively few, and 
not supported by the Church – the latter 
remains important in Moldova. Second, the 
state becomes more and more persistent in 
persecuting the protesters. Third, the radi-
cals demand too much of those who join 
them. Their struggle is not just against 
some bad legislation; they see the polit-
ical situation through apocalyptic lenses, 
encouraging people to destroy their docu-
ments and to hide in the forests. As a result, 
the radicals serve a narrow market niche 
for people seeking a ‘high-tension religious 
option’ (Stark and Finke 2000: 197; see 
also Iannaccone 2012). It is import ant for 
them not to exceed any ‘limit to strictness’ 
(Iannaccone 1994: 1201–4); but the radical 
movement may even enjoy limited popular-
ity if it manages to avoid mar ginalization.
So far the Metropolitanate of Moldova 
remains the strongest Orthodox actor, 
potentially able, unlike its niche-oriented 
competitors, to reach the wider society. 
Unfortunately, this strength owes much to 
what Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000: 
201) define as cultural inertia, that delays 
the acceptance of new religious suppliers. 
Restoration of the religious monopoly is 
hardly possible, but the Metropolitanate 
remains not fully confident about attracting 
young urbanites and mobilising parishion-
ers for political rallies. Its social and youth 
work remains sporadic. Adopting the strat-
egies of ‘public churches’ (probably bor-
rowed from the Russian mother church) 
would make the Metropolitanate a stronger 
religious competitor. The ecclesiastical mes-
sage concerning equal opportunities will 
be, in this case, better heard by society and 
the government. Nevertheless, even having 
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increased its influence, the Metropolitanate 
would never radicalize because of its fear of 
repeating ‘the Ukrainian scenario’. 
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